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Taxation without Information:
The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax Collection
Wei Cui *
Abstract: A prominent strand of recent economic and legal scholarship hypothesizes that thirdparty information reporting (TPIR) is essential to modern tax collection. The slogan, “no taxation
without information,” has captured researchers’ imagination and is even often presented as selfevident truth. This Article offers a fundamentally different perspective, arguing that the emphasis
on TPIR is misplaced. TPIR is used largely in the collection of the personal income tax but not of
many other types of modern taxes. Even for the personal income tax, TPIR also has close
substitutes which do not involve information transmission to the government. Theoretically,
appeals to TPIR are vitiated by the puzzle of payor compliance. And most purported empirical
evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR fails to provide causal identification.
I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations of modern tax collection,
we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal intermediaries” in a game of deterrence against
tax evaders. Instead, it would be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of social cooperation
under the rule of law. The co-evolution of the business firm and modern regulatory law may have
enabled modern governments to practice precisely “taxation without information”.
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Introduction
Successfully raising tax revenue is a defining mark of the “state capacity” of advanced
economies. 1 Building effective tax administration is one of the most urgent tasks facing the
poorer countries of the world in their pursuit of sustainable development. 2 These ideas have
recently fueled extraordinary policy initiatives among many nations, as well as become the focus
of cutting-edge research in political economy, public economics, economic history, and related
branches of the social sciences. 3 In 2015, the one hundred and ninety three United Nations (UN)
Member States reached two comprehensive agreements, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 4 and
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 5 Both agendas committed “to enhancing revenue
administration through modernized, progressive tax systems, improved tax policy and more
efficient tax collection…[and in particular to] strengthen international cooperation to support
1

See Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics, 99
AM. ECON. REV. 1218 (2009) and sources cited in note 1 therein; Mark Dincecco, The Rise of Effective States in
Europe, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 901 (2015) (“effective” states “have the extractive capacity to gather enough revenues,
and the productive capacity to better channel public funds”). For the thesis that modern “state capacity” helps to
explain the divergent paths of economic development of nations, see generally TIMOTHY BESLEY & TORSTEN
PERSSON, PILLARS OF PROSPERITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT CLUSTERS (2011); Daron
Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States, 52 J. MONETARY ECON. 1199 (2005); Pranab
Bardhan, State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 862
(2016).
2
See generally, Michael Keen, Taxation and Development—Again (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper
12/220, 2012); Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax Compliance, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/020215a.pdf. Press Release, United
Nations, Countries Reach Historic Agreement to Generate Financing for New Sustainable Development Agenda
(July 15, 2015) (“significant additional domestic public resources…will be critical to realizing sustainable
development and achieving the sustainable development goals”).
3
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality,
and Growth in Historical Perspective, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1167 (2000); Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Taxation
and Development, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 51 (A. J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2013); Henrik J. Kleven et
al., Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries, 83
ECONOMICA 219 (2016) [hereinafter KKS]; Dincecco, supra note 1.
4
United Nations (UN), Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for
Development , DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/frameworks/addisababaactionagenda.
5
UN, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
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efforts to build capacity in developing countries.” 6 A slew of major international projects were
launched on the sidelines of the Addis Ababa Conference and in its aftermath, involving the
coordination of international organizations that previously operated separately in this policy
area. 7 In the meantime, questions such as “Why do developing countries tax so little?” and “How
can developed countries tax so much?” now draw the attention of some of the most innovative
and influential social scientists. 8 These intellectual developments can be seen as complementary
to the global policy initiatives: if raising tax revenue is indeed crucial to the path to prosperity for
all nations in the world, a framework for understanding the institutional foundations of modern
tax collection is clearly in order.
Much of the recent, highly prominent social science research on the underpinnings of the
tax collection capacity of advanced economies has converged on a simple, seemingly obvious
line of reasoning. To collect tax, the government needs information about the taxable income,
transactions, and other tax attributes of taxpayers. But the government is always in a situation of
information asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers: the latter always have incentives to hide such
information. The government’s ability to overcome such information asymmetry therefore must
be crucial for tax collection. And, scholars seem to believe, the most powerful way by which
such asymmetry has been overcome is through third-party information reporting. 9 In the boldest
6

UN, supra note 4, Article 22.
For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) launched the Tax Inspectors Without Borders project to “help developing
countries bolster domestic revenues…by strengthening their tax audit capacities.” Press Release, United Nations,
Tax Inspectors without Borders: OECD and UNDP to work with developing countries to make tax audits more
effective, (July 13, 2015). Moreover, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) also launched a
new initiative to help developing countries strengthen their tax systems. Press Release, International Monetary Fund,
World Bank and the IMF Launch Joint Initiative to Support Developing Countries in Strengthening Tax Systems
(July 10, 2015). The organization International Tax Compact launched The Addis Tax Initiative, in which over 30
countries and international organizations teamed up to strengthen international cooperation in strengthening tax
administration, and in which participants commit to “collectively double their technical cooperation in the area of
domestic resource mobilization by 2020.” Press Release, International Tax Compact, On the occasion of the launch
of the ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE, (July 15, 2015). In October 2016, the second meeting of the signatories of the
Addis Tax Initiative was held in Paris, France. The meeting finalized the Work Plan for 2016/17, outlining the key
priorities of the Addis Tax Initiative. Addis Tax Initiative, 2nd Meeting of the Signatories of the Addis Tax Initiative,
Paris, France, ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/#slider-2.] More recently,
the OECD, IMF, WB and UN announced “The Platform for Collaboration on Tax”: see IMF et al., The Platform for
Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note (Working Paper, 2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/pr16176.pdf. A report was prepared for the G20 Finance Ministers
in the framework of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax: see IMF ET AL., ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN BUILDING TAX CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2016),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-external-support-in-building-tax-capacity-in-developingcountries.pdf.
8
KKS, supra note 3; Henrik J. Kleven, How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much? 28 J. ECON. PERSPECT 77 (2014);
Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little? 28 J. ECON. PERSPECT 99 (2014).
9
As the author of one widely-cited study that purports to provide empirical support for this intuitive reasoning puts
it:
“A fundamental constraint for taxation is that governments need to be able to observe transactions
in order to impose a tax on them. A growing literature therefore argues that understanding
information flows is central to effective taxation. When governments imperfectly observe
transactions, important differences emerge between forms of taxation that are equivalent in
standard models of taxation but differ in the information they generate for the government. Third7
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formulation of this idea, Henrik Kleven, Claus Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez claim that thirdparty information reporting is a defining feature of modern taxation. 10 In other words,
mechanisms for transmitting taxpayer information to the government represent the institutional
foundations of modern tax collection. To support this bold conjecture, a small but “rapidly
growing” empirical literature 11 has emerged that claims to offer novel evidence for the power of
third-party information reporting (“TPIR”). 12 The slogan, “no taxation without information”, not
only has captured researchers’ imagination but is often even presented as self-evident truth. 13
Indeed, to many U.S. scholars and policymakers, this claim may seem quite familiar. U.S.
policymakers, for example, have long been interested in narrowing the “tax gap”, i.e. the
discrepancy between the tax revenue that is collected and the revenue that ought to be
collected. 14 And greater information report has often been considered as a key approach to
achieving this goal. 15 Although whether the scope of information reporting should be expanded
has been a matter of century-long debates, 16 important legislative actions taken in 2009 have
given greater emphasis to TPIR. 17 Since 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has required
credit card companies and payment settlement entities such as eBay to report payments made to
party reporting, verifiable paper trails, and whistle-blowers are thought to play an important role in
facilitating tax enforcement.”
Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax, 105
AM. ECON. REV. 2539 (2015) (citations omitted).
10
KKS, supra note 3. See Part I infra.
11
The description of this empirical literature as “rapidly growing” is borrowed from Joel Slemrod et al., Does
Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax Compliance? 149 Journal of Public Economics 1–
19 (2017), discussed in detail in Part III infra. For a summary review, see Joel Slemrod, Tax Compliance and
Enforcement: New Research and its Policy Implications s.3.3 (Ross School of Business, Paper No. 1302, 2016). For
examples of some widely cited studies, see Pomeranz, supra note 9; Henrik J. Kleven, et al, Unwilling or Unable to
Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651 (2011); Carrillo et al., Dodging
the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED
ECONOMICS (forthcoming); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors (London School of Economics and Political
Science, Working Paper, 2016); and Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, Under the Radar: The Effect of
Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance (Warwick Economics Research, Paper Series No. 1070, 2015).
12
In this Article, I will use “information reporting,” “third-party reporting”, and TPIR interchangeably.
13
Pomeranz, supra note 9.
14
See, e.g., Understanding the Tax Gap, IRS.GOV (July. 16, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-the-TaxGap.
15
Both the economic and legal literatures on tax compliance in the United States are very large and not possible to
review here. For recent legal scholarship, see, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the
Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted? 78 FORDHAM LAW REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman,
Reducing Information Gaps]; Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STANFORD LAW REV. 695 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps]; Joseph
Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506 (2007).
16
See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative Practice”: Social
Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 144 (2016); Anuj C. Desai, What a
History of Withholding Tells Us About The Relationship Between Statutes and Constitutional Law, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. 859 (2014); Joseph J. Thorndike, Wall Street, Washington, and the Business of Information Reporting, TAX
HISTORY PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/cf7c9c870b600b9585256df80075b9dd/a518ae7d8d5eaf23852571360068
fc5e?opendocument.
17
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, § 403; Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3091(e), 122 Stat. 2654, 2911.
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individuals and businesses. 18 Financial institutions are also now under the obligation to furnish
information about the tax basis of securities to taxpayers and the government to determine gains
or losses on the sale of securities. 19 Proposals to further expand TPIR continue to be advanced. 20
Most importantly, the ever-expanding computing capacities of modern digital economies make
the recording and transmission of transactional information to tax collectors easier and easier,
which in turn seems to promise more effective government control of taxpayer information. 21
This Article contributes to these vibrant intellectual and policy discussions by offering a
fundamentally different perspective. Much recent scholarship, I argue, has mischaracterized the
role of information reporting, which has also led to increasing confusions about the institutional
basis of modern tax collection. To develop this perspective, I first engage in a de-bunking
exercise, aimed at exposing weaknesses in the arguments and evidence adduced for the
importance of TPIR. I show that TPIR is largely used in the collection of the personal income
tax, and plays no role in most other types of modern taxes. 22 Moreover, although information
reporting and withholding are crucial to the collection of the personal income tax, to portray
them as overcoming pre-existing information asymmetries between the government and
taxpayers relies on legal artifices. 23 I also show that the emphasis on TPIR leaves it mysterious
why payors specifically, and business organizations generally, would comply with the tax law. 24
In particular, the prevalent belief that payor withholding or information reporting generates selfenforcing compliance dynamics is both practically unconvincing and theoretically naïve. Finally,
most purported evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR is based on flawed empirical inferences. 25
These de-bunking arguments demonstrate that TPIR cannot play the explanatory role that
social scientists have assigned it: at least until the present, giving governments effective access to
taxpayer information through third parties does not explain the success of modern tax
administration. The arguments highlight previously neglected weaknesses in an apparent
scholarly consensus: what many social scientists are increasingly coming to use as “stylized
facts” (to motivate further theorizing and empirical work) actually involve grave misconceptions
about the basis of modern tax administration. This is the first major contribution of the Article.
In a second set of arguments, I articulate a new way of looking at the feasibility of TPIR,
in terms of when information about the mutual identities of market participants is likely to be
transmitted through market mechanisms. This perspective defines the limits of TPIR more
sharply and parsimoniously than previous approaches, and suggests that TPIR will tend to be
18

Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6050W. See Part III below for a discussion of empirical literature analyzing the
impact of credit card and third-party settlement entity reporting; see also Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax
Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56 (2017).
19
I.R.C. § 6045(g).
20
James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Improving Tax Basis Reporting for Passthrough Entities, 145 TAX NOTES 809 (2014).
21
James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Whither the Tax Gap? (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/James%20Alm%20and%20Jay%20Soled.pdf; Kleven,
supra note 8, at 81 (“the gradual transition from cash to credit card transactions may eventually eliminate most tax
evasion even for self-employed individuals.”)
22
See Part I infra.
23
See Part II.A infra.
24
See Part II.B infra.
25
See Part II.C infra.
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incomplete with respect to business income. 26 I illustrate this perspective through an important
recent study of the effect of TPIR by credit card companies on U.S. taxpayers, 27 and, drawing on
the same study, provide an explanation of how the incompleteness of TPIR renders it an
ineffective tool in limiting tax evasion. This is the second major contribution of the Article. 28
Finally, I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations of modern tax
collection, we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal intermediaries” in a game of
deterrence against tax evaders. Instead, it would be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of
social cooperation under the rule of law. If firms enable social cooperation, but do so only with
the support of a legal system, then compliance with law in business operations can often be
expected. There need not be anything special about compliance with tax law in particular, and
any valid explanation of why firms comply with the tax law is unlikely to be distinct from
explanations of the phenomenon of business compliance with the law in general. 29 I argue that
this explanatory strategy is more consistent with the history of modern taxation—in particular,
the fact that labor and workplace regulations were implemented well before the adoption of
information reporting—than explaining tax compliance in terms of TPIR. The third major
contribution of the article is thus to put tax compliance into the context of business compliance
with the law in general, and connecting both with the theory of the firm.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents some important historical facts that have
emboldened economists to hypothesize that TPIR is the linchpin of modern taxation. It then
contrasts this bold hypothesis with a much more cautious view, which holds TPIR to be a
derivative phenomenon. Part II offers a series of arguments for the latter view, identifying
weaknesses in both the conceptual arguments and empirical evidence for the relevance of TPIR.
Part III sets out a new theory about the limitation of information reporting, and shows how this
theory is consistent with recent empirical evidence from the U.S. on the limited impact of TPIR.
Parts IV and V then contrasts the conceptions of firms as “fiscal intermediaries” and as sites of
social cooperation. Part IV highlights the inadequacies of the former. Part V sketches out the
latter conception and its promise both in terms of historical plausibility and theoretical
coherence. Part VI briefly discusses some of the policy implications of the arguments in Parts IV. A brief Conclusion then follows.
I. Information Reporting: The Linchpin of Modern Taxation?
Political economists who view taxation as a core component of modern state capacity
emphasize that richer countries tax more, and any given country tends to tax more as it gets
richer. 30 In a recent, influential paper, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (abbreviated below as “KKS”)
show that these patterns are driven entirely by countries’ adoption of what they call “modern
taxes”. They include in the definition of “modern taxes” personal and corporate income taxes,
26

See Part III.A infra.
See Part III.B infra.
28
See Part III.C infra.
29
See Part V infra.
30
KKS, supra note 3, at 1; Besley & Persson, supra note 3, at 56; Besley & Persson, supra note 8, at 102-03;
Kleven, supra note 8, at 77-78.
27
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the value-added tax (VAT), and payroll taxes and social security contributions. By contrast,
“traditional taxes” are defined as all other taxes, including property taxes, inheritance taxes,
excise and sales taxes, custom duties, etc. Examining data from 2005 regarding 29 OECD
countries and 43 non-OECD countries, they show that there exists a clear positive correlation
between (i) GDP per capita and (ii) the ratio of revenue from modern taxes to GDP, but there is
no correlation between GDP per capita and the ratio of revenue to GDP from traditional taxes 31
(see Figure 1 below). Further, using data for 14 advanced economies over a 160-year time
horizon, they show that again, the growth in tax revenue in these countries over time is driven
entirely by growth in “modern taxes”, with no long-run increase (and typically a weak decline) in
“traditional taxes” (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 1: Correlations between GDP and Revenue from “Modern” and “Traditional” Taxes 32

KKS offer an interpretation for these historical patterns that has gained great popularity
among political economists studying tax administration. 33 They postulate that in any country, the
growth of tax revenue is constrained by the enforceability of taxes, which depends on the
availability of taxpayer information to the government. All “modern taxes” are basically taxes in
respect of which the “enforceability constraint” has been loosened or overcome, through the
mechanism of “third-party reporting”. By this latter term, KKS mean arrangements whereby
firms act as intermediaries to collect information about other taxpayers and transmit such
information to the government. 34 They argue that when firms get sufficiently large, they are
more likely to act reliably as such intermediaries, because the risk of firms’ being caught

31

KKS, supra note 3, at 7 (thus “the relationship between taxes and development across countries is driven by a
stark variation in tax structure across countries.” Emphasis in the original)
32
Source: id., at 224.
33
See sources cited in note 11 supra.
34
This thesis is also advanced in Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 130 (2006).
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cheating increases as firm size grows. 35 Therefore, roughly speaking, they present a picture
where the growth of firm size in an economy causes “third-party reporting” to become more
reliable, which in turn makes taxes more enforceable, and the optimal level of taxation more
achievable.
That large firms tend to be more compliant with the tax law (and other types of law) is an
important, but not uncommon, observation. 36 What KKS’s theory adds to such observation is the
contention that this matters for the capacity of governments to collect tax revenue because it
helps solve a pre-existing problem of information asymmetry, i.e. the government’s lack of
information about ultimate taxpayers such as individual income-earners. 37
Figure 2: Revenue Composition over Time for Select Countries 38

Other scholars have recently offered explanations of modern tax compliance in a similar
spirit. That is, they first postulate information asymmetry as the most important kind of
enforceability constraint for taxes, and then identify exogenously given types of economic
35

See Part IV for a critique of this aspect of KKS.
See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21. KKS show, using recent data from 50 countries, that tax revenue and share
of workforce in large firms are positively correlated across countries. KKS, supra note 3, 8-9.
37
KKS also provides a theory of why large firms are more compliant—in terms of the increasing risk of being
exposed by whistle-blowers. Part IV infra argues, on the contrary, that many other explanations may be at play and
are much more relevant.
38
Source: id., at 225. KKS provide comparable historical information for other industrial economies in the Online
Appendix to their article.
36
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development that relax such constraint. For example, Anders Jensen claims that because
economically more developed countries have larger sectors of formal employment, they are able
to make greater use of TPIR (with respect to wage income), and therefore more successfully
overcome the information asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers. 39 Roger Gordon and Wei Li argue that
since tax collection depends on audits and the effectiveness of audits depends on the existence of
paper trails, the level of development of a country’s financial sector will substantially determine
the country’s capacity of tax collection. 40
However, while the purported centrality of TPIR to modern tax compliance has become
commonplace among many scholars, careful reflection suggests that the above evidence is
actually consistent with opposite view, namely that the use of TPIR is quite limited in tax
administration in advanced economies. To start, there is no obvious way in which the corporate
income tax is enforced through TPIR. Corporations report income and deductions largely on the
basis of their own accounting records. This is illustrated in the United States by regulatory rules
that specifically exempt corporations from information reporting requirements that are applicable
to payments to individuals: businesses that purchase services worth more than $600 a year from
a service provider generally need to report such payments to the IRS, but not if the provider is a
corporation. 41 The same corporate exemption applies to the payment of interest and dividends. 42
The value added tax (VAT), which is a large source of revenue in most countries
(although not in the U.S., which has not adopted a VAT), also does not involve information
reporting. 43 Under the VAT, firms—which are nominally the taxpayers—charge VAT on goods
and services sold to other firms and to individuals, and firms engaged in businesses may claim
tax credits for the VAT that they have been charged on input purchases. 44 They then remit any
net VAT amount—tax charged on sales minus input tax credits—to the government (hence the
term “value added”). However, firms generally do not transmit information about payments to
and specific transactions with vendors and customers to the government, but instead aggregate
transaction information into lines on simple tax returns. 45
The prevalence of TPIR is really most pronounced in the individual income tax context,
and only for wage and passive investment income. U.S. workers, for example, receive W-2
39

Anders Jensen, Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System (unpublished working paper, 2015),
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/sem2016/jobmarket/jmp_jensen.pdf.
40
Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation, 93
J. PUBLIC ECON. 855 (2009). Gordon and Li view financial institutions primarily as the depository of information to
which the government may have access, rather than intermediaries that automatically transmit such information to
the government. However, the literature on TPIR (cited in note 11 supra) has treated Gordon and Li’s work as
reaching kindred conclusions. See Part IV below for a critique of conceptions of the firm both as intermediaries and
as depositories of information.
41
U.S. Treasury Regulations §1.6041-3(p)(1).
42
U.S. Treasury Regulations §1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A)
43
KKS acknowledge this point in a footnote (KKS, supra note 3, footnote 8), but refers to the fact that the VAT
creates a paper trail. The existence of a paper trail does help audits, but it does not automatically provide the
government with any information before an audit. See Alm & Soled 2016, supra note 21 (contrasting information
reporting and audit).
44
See ALAN SCHENK ET AL., VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2d ed. 2015), Chapters 1-2.
45
Id., Chapters 5-6.
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forms each year from their employers regarding their wage income and the federal, state as well
as social security taxes that have been withheld from such income. U.S. investors receive 1099
forms regarding their dividend, interest, capital gain, and certain other types of passive
investment income. Social security and pension payments, which one can also think of as forms
of passive investment income, are subject to TPIR as well. These types of income represent a
very substantial portion of the U.S. individual income tax base, and therefore TPIR may appear
to be thoroughly built into the tax. But, in reality, that is not the case. The practical and political
difficulties of extending information reporting beyond the contexts of employment and passive
investment income are well-known. 46 The most important examples of information reporting
outside these contexts are the long-standing requirement to report business payments made to
independent contractors providing services, 47 and the much more recent requirements for credit
card companies and other payment settlement entities to report sales settled by non-cash
means. 48 The effectiveness of these two types of information reporting is still controversial; Part
III infra will specifically review recent empirical evidence for the (in)effectiveness of credit-card
reporting. But few would disagree that TPIR with respect to individual business income is
largely incomplete. 49
Overall, therefore, it is fair to say that TPIR is used very little in the corporate income
tax, VAT, and the taxation of individual business income, while it is used with respect to
individual’s wage and passive financial income. Even in the United States, which relies on the
personal income tax for revenue to a much greater extent than other OECD countries, 50 sales and
property taxes and corporate income taxes (none of which generally relies on TPIR) generate
about 36% of total government revenue. 51 Another 24% of total government revenue comprises
social security contributions, and as discussed in Part II.A, at least half of this revenue (and
maybe the entirety of it) can be characterized as not involving TPIR. 52 Thus emphasizing TPIR
seems to privilege, without obvious justification, (certain elements of) the individual income tax.
A more neutral characterization seems to be that it is business organizations that play essential
roles in collecting all modern taxes: they are intermediaries (third parties) in respect of several
types of taxable individual income, but are taxpayers in their own right in respect both of taxable
individual business income and of other taxes.
This, however, is not how scholars—not just economists but also legal scholars—have
written about third-party reporting. 53 The standard view is that, first, TPIR is crucial for tax
collection on wage and passive financial income, and second, the practical limitations on third46

See sources cited in note 16 supra. See also, Joseph J. Thorndike, Do We Have a Tax Compliance Crisis in
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party reporting for other types of (individual taxable) income may be overcome, when the cost of
compliance can be sufficiently reduced. If this is correct, the present limitations of TPIR are a
matter of mere detail, while the power of TPIR is the more basic “stylized fact” that is significant
for social science.
In the following two Parts, I argue against this standard view in two ways. Part II argues
that TPIR is a derivative component in modern tax administration. Part III offers an explanation
of why information reporting would generally not work outside the wage and passive investment
income context. The explanation implies that there are hard limits to the completeness of
information reporting, which in turn constrains its utility.
II. Information Reporting as a Derivative Institution
To properly evaluate the significance of TPIR, three basic facts, to which the existing
literature has given inadequate attention, must be taken into account. First, where it is applied in
modern tax collection, TPIR often has close substitutes that would not support the claim that tax
collection is conditioned on the transmission of taxpayer information to the government. These
substitutes show that the dependence of taxation on information transmission is an illusion.
Second, the appeal to TPIR leaves it mysterious why payors would comply with reporting
obligations instead of colluding with payees. Third, although some evidence for the effectiveness
of TPIR is routinely cited, none of such evidence identifies the causal effect of TPIR on
compliance.
A. The illusion of information transmission
The effective use of information reporting in the income tax context is observed mainly
for wage and passive financial income. Reflection suggests that these components of the
individual income tax base are distinctive in the following way: third parties—namely payors of
wage, dividend, interest, etc.—possess both near-complete information about the specific items
of income and control over their payment. 54 But for any item of income such that there is a payor
that possesses both complete information about it and control over its payment, information
reporting is only one among several ways in which the government can collect tax.
One clear alternative is final withholding. For example, under the final withholding
systems adopted in many European countries today, employers simply deduct tax from wage
payments, and employees would not have to file income tax returns themselves. 55 Similarly,
banks paying interest and corporations distributing dividends simply withhold tax on interest and
dividend payments at flat rates, without the need for individual taxpayers to report the receipt of
such payments. 56 Under final withholding, even though the recipients of income are nominally
54
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the taxpayers, they generally have no compliance obligations in respect of the income subject to
withholding. Any information transmitted to the government simply helps the latter to determine
whether the payors have performed withholding correctly. In other words, third parties do not
transmit information to the government in order to help the latter monitor the compliance of
ultimate taxpayers.
There is in fact a more complete substitute for information reporting. For any item of
income that could be subject to final withholding, an equivalent tax can be imposed simply as an
excise tax on the payer. In the U.S., a contemporary example of this is the “social security taxes”
imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) portion of the Internal Revenue
Code. 57 Under the FICA tax regime, "taxes with respect to employment" consist of an "excise"
tax on employers 58 and an "income" tax on employees, 59 each of which is a percentage of the
employees' wages. While the income tax on employees is required to "be collected by the
employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when
paid," 60 the excise tax on employers is simply paid by employers themselves. However, from the
perspectives of the employer and of the government, this distinction between the excise
(employer) and withholding (employee) portions of Social Security contribution is merely
nominal. They involve exactly the same calculations and remittance actions by the same parties,
namely employers. 61 It is also generally believed that they have the same economic incidence. 62
Thus although one can think of the withholding tax (the “employee portion”) as involving the
reporting by a third party (i.e. the employer) on the taxable wage of an ultimate taxpayer (i.e. the
employee), this characterization would not be applicable to the excise tax that is administered in
an identical fashion.
Indeed, the equivalence—from an enforcement perspective—between a final withholding
tax and an excise tax on the payor featured prominently in the history of the U.S. tax system. The
first U.S. withholding tax, enacted by the 1862 Revenue Act, was applicable to (i) the interest
from railroad company bonds and the dividends from railroad company stock, (ii) dividends paid
by banks, trust companies, savings institutions, and insurance companies, and (iii) salaries of
federal government employees in excess of 600 dollars per year. 63 The nominal taxpayers for
the tax—the persons on whom the tax was imposed—were the payors, not the recipients, of
interest, dividends and salaries. 64 Therefore, whether to label the 1862 tax an excise tax on
payors or an withholding tax on payees is a choice involving little substance. 65
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Even more tellingly, the Civil War dividends tax led to the proposal in 1894 of the first
corporate income tax: because in the nineteenth century corporations generally distributed most
of their earnings as dividends, the corporate income tax was little different form a tax on
dividends. 66 The corporate income tax, that is, was a mutation from a withholding tax on
dividends. Although one could think of the corporate income tax as involving information
reporting on shareholders, it is uncommon to literally refer to it as such. 67 But this point also
works the other way: although one does not usually think of social security withholding on wage
earners as an excise tax on the employer, one certainly could, just as the Internal Revenue Code
explicitly labels the portion of FICA taxes imposed on employers.
The underlying point is this. Once a certain tax base is determined, whom the statute
designates as the taxpayer, payor or recipient, is to a considerable extent a legal artifice. 68 Where
a “third party” possesses both complete information regarding an item of income belonging to
the tax base and control over that item of income, then that third party can itself be made into the
taxpayer with respect to such element of the tax base. There would be no need to provide
information about a different taxpayer. If two taxes are enforced in the same way, but in terms of
legal terminology there is a “third party” under one tax but no “third party” under the other tax,
the “third party” aspect of the first way of enforcing tax is clearly superfluous.
Just as importantly, consider the question why a government would choose, in connection
with any item of income, information reporting with respect to the recipient rather than excise
taxation with respect to the payor. The answer is generally that there is some personal
circumstance—be it progressive tax rates that depend on the recipient’s total income (i.e. not just
income from particular payments or payors), credits and deductions, personal expenses, and so
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on—to which the payors do not have easy access. 69 Therefore such private information would
have to come from the recipients themselves. Insofar as such private information is not provided
to the payors, excises or final withholding are not feasible, and accurate tax collection depends
on compliance by the ultimate income recipients themselves. But this is just to say that the
adoption of information reporting as opposed to withholding/excises is precisely premised upon
the incompleteness of information possessed by payors (third parties), it is not a solution to the
incompleteness of information held by the government.
This point has ample illustrations both historically and comparatively. In the history of
U.S. taxation, for instance, there were no progressive tax rates for the withholding/excise tax
mechanisms under the 1862 Revenue Act. 70 Conversely, progressive income tax rates were
introduced under the 1913 Income Tax Act, which rendered the withholding provisions of the
Act infeasible, and information reporting replaced it. 71 A comparative study carried out by the
U.S. Treasury Department showed that the extent to which a country’s income tax system takes
into account individual taxpayer circumstances largely explains why some countries adopt final
withholding for individual income while others do not. 72
In sum, information reporting becomes relevant only when the tax law permits private
information to be relevant. This undermines the pretense that there is some necessary, preexisting information asymmetry—for example, between the recipients of wages, salaries, and
dividends, on the one hand, and the government, on the other—which information reporting
reduces or overcomes. Such asymmetry comes into place only when the government has made
the choice of giving information private to these recipients policy significance. Information
asymmetries and information reporting are two sides of the same coin.
B. The puzzle of payor compliance
There is a different, more basic, reason why information reporting offers an inadequate
explanation of compliance even in the context of taxing individual wage and financial income.
An obvious question arises: what account for compliance on the part of the “third parties” that
perform information reporting and/or withholding? What, for example, prevent employers from
regularly colluding with employees in under-reporting wages, and bargaining with employees for
the benefit of the tax savings from such underreporting? 73 Such collusion is widespread today in
developing countries. 74 It is also prevalent in the informal sectors in developed countries: in the
U.S., for example, the level of compliance with the “nanny tax” is perceived to be low and has
remained so for many years. 75 It is in fact quite visible even in the formal sectors of developed
69
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countries: many employers and employees push the envelope on what counts as non-taxable
fringe benefits, on the basis that the IRS is unlikely to conduct audits. 76 Given that there are
rarely other “third parties” monitoring the “third party” required to perform information
reporting, why does the latter comply with tax law?
A typical answer given to this question is that employers can claim deductions for wage
payments, which lower the employer’s income tax liability. The employee and the employer thus
have “adverse interests”, or “opposing incentives”, with respect to reporting wage payments:
while the employee stands to lose from employer reporting, the employer gains from it.
Information reporting is therefore “self-enforcing”. 77 It is also often assumed that this reasoning
applies to other types of payments. 78
While this answer may be plausible in certain contexts, it both lacks empirical generality
and is theoretically naïve. In terms of empirical validity, the answer may seem to have appeal in
the U.S., where personal income tax rates have been relatively low and the nominal corporate
income tax rate high since the 1960s. Therefore employer’s wage deductions may often save
more tax dollars than the tax liabilities of employees. However, even in the U.S., there are many
situations where payments of income taxable to payees are not deductible or generate minimal
benefits to payors: examples include non-deductible payments such as dividends and personal
expenditures (e.g. childcare), and deductible payments made by payors subject to low or zero
effective tax rates (e.g. due to losses, accelerated depreciation, and tax exemptions). Indeed, it is
generally believed that the effective tax rate of U.S. corporations is far lower than the nominal
tax rate, 79 and may well be lower than the individual income tax rate applicable to many
employees. And in many OECD countries, the effective tax rate applicable to wage income
(especially when payroll taxes or social security contributions are considered) far exceeds the
corporate income tax rate applicable to employers. Therefore the net potential tax saving from
non-reporting of wage income is quite significant.
Generally, holding information reporting to be self-enforcing is theoretically naïve
because it assumes that the parties to the transactions (both the party that must declare income
and the party that claim expense deductions) are subject to similar effective tax rates. But when
this is the case, the government precisely collects no net revenue from the transaction: the
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inclusion by the payee is cancelled by the deduction by the payor. 80 It is when parties are not
subject to the same tax rates that the government can collect net revenue from a transaction, but
then, putting aside transaction costs and the failure to reach and maintain collusive bargains, the
potential will always exist for the parties to collude and lower the net payment to the
government. For instance, if employer’s corporate income tax rate is substantially higher than
personal income tax rate applicable to wage recipients, an incentive arises for employers and
employees to collude to over-report wage payments.
This problem—the pervasive incentives for payor-payee collusion—is relevant even if
final withholding, excise taxation, or any other alternative to information reporting is adopted. It
is thus of fundamental significance in theorizing about compliance, and is taken seriously by
theorists who rigorously model tax compliance. 81
C. Lack of causal identification
The following fact is routinely touted as evidence for TPIR’s effectiveness of for
securing compliance. In the U.S. and a number of other countries, tax administrators study the
“tax gap” by conducting audits designed to precisely measure the compliance level of a
representative sample of the population. 82 Many of these studies have revealed that taxpayer
compliance rate is much higher for wages and passive financial income than it is for selfemployment income. 83 Since wage and passive financial income is usually subject to TPIR while
self-employment income is not, it is argued, higher compliance is produced by TPIR. 84
Such inferences from correlation to causation are, however, highly unreliable.
Specifically, it is rarely possible to disentangle the use of TPIR from two types of confounding
factors, which may undermine both the internal and external validity of the inferences. These two
factors are (a) the nature of the (individual) income and (b) the nature of the payor.
Consider the first. As suggested in Part II.A supra (and as will be further elaborated in
Part III infra), TPIR seems particularly tailored to wage and passive investment income. Yet
governments can often secure compliance with tax collection with respect to these types of
income without relying on TPIR. For example, most financial transactions create paper (or
digital) trails, and such documentation trails, as opposed to TPIR, may induce compliance with
respect to passive financial income. None of the studies purportedly demonstrating the
80
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effectiveness of TPIR, however, tries to distinguish the effect of TPIR from the effect of paper
trails. Yet the distinction is important: a paper trail is useful only conditional on the
government’s decision to audit taxpayers, while TPIR itself precisely would affect the making of
that decision.
Similarly, as argued earlier, tax can be effectively collected from wages and financial
income through withholding or, equivalent administratively, payor excise taxation. There has
been no study to show that TPIR is more effective than withholding or excise taxation (or, where
withholding and information reporting are simultaneously implemented, that the latter is
effective independently of the former.) This implies that no evidence has been produced that “but
for” TPIR, the level compliance could not be as high as is actually observed. 85
Consider next the nature of the payor. In one study analyzing Danish taxpayer data,
Henrik Kleven and co-authors found that after controlling for both whether an item of income is
subject to TPIR and whether it is likely to be audited, the effect of firm size still has a significant
impact on the rate of tax evasion. They infer from this that “collusion between taxpayers and
third parties may be important in small firms” even in Denmark. 86 This suggests that firm size
may matter for compliance independently of the use of TPIR. By contrast, there has been no
study investigating the distinct effect of TPIR while holding firm size constant. 87
Purported evidence for TPIR’s effectiveness that is not based on individual tax return
data is even more problematic. For example, some point to the fact that economies with larger
formal employment sectors have higher tax-to-GDP ratios. 88 Yet these are likely to be economies
with greater presence of large firms, which are responsible for paying for the bulk of wages. The
compliance of such firms, as opposed to TPIR per se, may be the reason for the high level of
observed compliance with respect to wage income. The fact that much tax revenue is collected
through taxes not involving TPIR further weakens the credibility of claims about TPIR’s
relevance.
If there is causation in this area, it is more plausible to regard it as lying between the large
tax base of wages and financial income in advanced economies, on the one hand, and the
collection of revenue from such income, on the other. When a large wage and financial income
tax base is absent, information reporting could have little use. But once such conventions are
developed, other collection mechanisms such as final withholding or payor excise taxation may
be deployed instead of information reporting. The differences among these different collection
mechanisms do not map onto differences in enforcement and are merely nominal. Therefore the
“third party” aspect of information reporting cannot constitute genuine causal mechanism.
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III. The Boundaries of Third-Party Reporting
Scholars who hold information reporting to be essential to modern tax compliance also
tend to express great optimism in information reporting’s future. To them, the benefits of
information reporting are proven, and its cost can only go down. 89 So far, I have questioned
whether information reporting’s benefits have really been proven. In this Part, I suggest a new
way of thinking about how the cost of TPIR determines its limits, i.e. why we find third-party
reporting in some places and not others. Moreover, I discuss some strong evidence of the
ineffectiveness of TPIR beyond its traditional spheres.
A. Previous attempts at cost-benefit analyses of information reporting
Legal scholars have previously attempted to articulate a framework for analyzing the
costs and benefits of third-party reporting. Yet the predictive power of what they have suggested
is limited. For example, Leandra Lederman has described six conditions which information
reporting requirements should generally satisfy: 90
a) The party furnishing the information report should be at arm’s-length from, and should be
unlikely to benefit from collusion with the taxpayer.
b) Only those who possess a bookkeeping infrastructure should be required to information
report.
c) Information reporting parties should be fewer in number than taxpayers reported on,
allowing the government to centralize the sources of information.
d) “Information reporting is most effective when it provides all of the information necessary
for the government to match the third-party report with corresponding amounts on the
taxpayer's return; partial reporting reduces enforcement efficiency.”
e) There should be few ways for the taxpayer to cheaply avoid information reporting.
f) Transactions that do not contribute substantially to the tax gap in the absence of
information reporting should not be prime targets for information reporting.
It is not hard to see that the predictive power of these six factors is weak. Consider the
idea that parties furnishing the information report “should be unlikely to benefit from
collusion”. 91 In reality, the potential for collusion among employers and employees to evade
taxes (and for similar collusion among other arm’s length parties) is ever present. 92 This has
nonetheless not precluded employer information reporting from being adopted. Similarly, it is
true that those required to information report generally possess a bookkeeping infrastructure, and
are fewer in number than taxpayers reported on. But these two factors are equally present in
contexts where third-party reporting is generally not adopted. Supermarkets and department
stores possess bookkeeping infrastructures and are fewer in number than individual shoppers.
Yet governments do not require retail stores to report the individual purchases made by shoppers
(although stores may be asked to collect sales taxes). Finally, the principles that there should be
limited opportunities for cheap avoidance, and that TPIR’s costs should be commensurate with
89
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its benefits, clearly apply to legal design in general, and do not specifically explain the scope of
third-party reporting.
Factor (d) on Professor Lederman’s list, however, does imply a way of predicting the use
of information reporting. When there is discrepancy between gross payment and taxable income,
information reporting by the payor need to be structured to reconcile such discrepancies to be
useful. For example, when brokers were only required to report proceeds from sales of securities
to the IRS, without reporting the tax basis of the securities in respect of their owners, the
information reported was only of limited utility. 93 The requirement commencing in 2011 for
brokers to report on the tax basis of securities thus illustrates a change from incomplete to more
complete reporting on capital gain and loss. 94 Conversely, as we will see through the extended
discussion of recent credit card reporting in the U.S. below, 95 when discrepancies between gross
payment and taxable income cannot be reconciled, the utility of information reporting for the
government is sharply reduced. 96
Other scholars have also noted the need for information reporting to be complete to be
effective. 97 However, when is information reporting likely to be incomplete? Little attention has
been given to answering this question. I will now suggest an answer: information reporting is
likely to be incomplete whenever the income-generating activity involves many market
transactions from which agency relationships and financial claims are absent.
B. Agency relationships, financial claims, and non-anonymity of transacting parties
It appears that all instances of TPIR in the individual income taxation context involves
either of or a combination of two kinds of relationships: (i) a relationship of agency, or (ii) a
contractual relationship, especially one establishing a financial claim. For example, employment
is an agency relationship. Financial income typically arises from financial claims, though in
modern financial markets financial claims tend to be intermediated by layers of agency
relationships. 98
Market transactions involving agency relationships and financial clams are distinctive in
the following respect: they require mutual knowledge of the identities of the transacting parties. 99
It is the intrinsic nature of an agency relationship for the principal and agent to know who each
93

Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1743.
See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1743.
95
Part III.C infra.
96
But information reporting may still serve purposes other than transmitting information to the government. See Part
III.C infra.
97
See Bankman, supra note 15; Slemrod et al., supra note 11; Paul Carrillo et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined..
98
For a recent discussion in the tax literature of such relationships, see Reid Thompson & David Weisbach,
Attributes of Ownership, 67 TAX L. REV. 249 (2014).
99
Government transfers such as low-income support or supplement income for the unemployed, which are often
subject to information reporting and/or withholding, are also inherently non-anonymous. Some agency relationships
and financial claims may nonetheless involve anonymity (e.g. the use of bearer instruments). So one may think of
the presence of agency relationships and financial claims as generally necessary but not sufficient conditions for the
keeping of mutual identities.
94

19

other are. Similarly, financial claims by definition persist over time, therefore the parties need
the identities of their counterparties to locate them later on. Thus parties that have financial
claims against one another generally do not remain anonymous. 100 By contrast, the sale and
purchase of goods and services generally transpire in such a way that parties need not know the
identities of their counterparties, or any case do not retain information about such identities.
Transactions in goods and services require the keeping of identities only insofar as they create
claims over time (e.g. warranty for defective products) or the relationship of agency.
The distinctiveness of agency relationships and financial transactions in terms of the
keeping of party identities has, to my knowledge, seldom been noted. 101 It is, however, related to
the claims that law and economics scholars have made about the contexts in which parties make
enforceable contracts. Polinsky and Shavell, for example, suggest that contracts are first needed
in “virtually any kind of financial arrangement.” 102 For similar reasons, they suggest that parties
make enforceable contracts to arrange “the supply of customized or specialized goods and
services, which cannot be purchased on a spot market in a simultaneous exchange for money.” 103
The presence of agency relationships or financial claims predicts the boundaries of
information reporting remarkably well. In the U.S., most types of information reporting are done
by parties in agency relationships or subject to financial claims. Reporting by employers and
brokers are examples of the former; reporting by payors of interest, dividends, social security
payments, and by partnerships and S-corporations are examples of the latter. Recently introduced
reporting by payment settlement entities such as Visa and third party settlement entities such as
eBay 104 can be viewed as based on both agency and financial relationships. The major deviation
from reporting by principals, agents, and parties subject to financial claims is reporting by
businesses of payments to service providers of annual amounts in excess of $600 (i.e. the
issuance of 1099-MISC forms). Even here, the limitation of information reporting to recipients
of services (as opposed to goods) requires rationalization, which is easily suggested by the fact
that most such services involve either an agency relationship or at least something very close.
The connection between agency and financial transactions, on the one hand, and
information reporting, on the other, is straightforward. In such transactions, market participants
routinely record payments made to identified parties. All the government has to do in imposing
reporting requirements is to harness such information. By contrast, in other transactions where
parties do not normally keep track of mutual identities, obtaining information about such
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identities and associating transactions with them introduce costs not originally present in market
activities. It is this kind of cost that policymakers may not find justifiable to impose, especially
when the information gathered would offer only an incomplete picture of the tax base.
A good illustration of this point is an third-party reporting device that has received
frequent favorable comments from academics in recent years, but which are perceived to deliver
only very mixed results in the real world: inducing consumers to report on merchants through the
use of lotteries. 105 Generally, we do not expect merchants to keep information about consumers,
for reasons just noted. Suppose, however, that a lottery is established, so that consumers who
report enough of their receipts from purchases may win a prize. Such a system was implemented
in Sao Paolo, Brazil. 106 To facilitate the lottery, merchants collected social security numbers
from consumers, and such information was later on used for processing lottery claims. It is clear
here that it is the lottery—a type of financial transaction 107—that created the need of collecting
information of consumers by merchants. By contrast, if we ask the question: How often do
merchants (i.e. sellers of ordinary goods and services) need social security numbers from the
customers? The answer is: Almost never. 108
Within the income tax context, the logic of agency relationships and financial claims
helps to explain the scope of information reporting in two ways. First, if income can be
computed only after taking deductions into account, and if either income or deductions or both
arise from activities involving multiple market transactions, information reporting by payors is
likely to require identity-keeping by market participants who would otherwise not keep mutual
identities. The additional social cost of gathering and transmitting transactional information
would be hard to justify, especially if even the aggregate of the transactions may not correctly
reflect income (given the difference between cash and accrual accounting, between ordinary and
capital expenditures, and so on).
Second, agency relationships and relationships of financial claims explain the imposition
of information reporting requirements even where the transactional amounts do not closely track
the tax base, i.e. despite the likely ineffectiveness of information reporting. U.S. broker
information reporting of gross receipts from the disposition of securities before the recent
introduction of basis reporting is an example of this. The filing of forms 1099-MISC and 1099-K
is another. Here, the adoption of information reporting can be rationalized at least by its
relatively low cost—the government is merely harnessing information that market participants
already possess.
105

For favorable academic comments on consumer lotteries in information reporting, see, e.g., Bankman, supra note
15, at 510-11; Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1753; Slemrod, supra note 11; and Joana
Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors (London School of Economics and Political Science Working Paper, 2016).
For critical discussion of real-world experience, see, e.g., IMF, supra note 2, at 29-30; Jonas Fooken et al.,
Improving VAT Compliance—Random Rewards for Tax Compliance (European Commission Taxation Papers
Working Paper No. 51-2014, 2014).
106
Naritomi, supra note 105.
107
Many consumer lotteries aimed at improving tax collection involve instantaneous lotteries, and thus simply give
incentives to consumers to help create paper trails (e.g. sales receipts) as opposed to actually involving them in
information reporting. See Fooken, supra note 105.
108
Consumers may voluntarily keep information about merchants (for purposes of returns, warranties, etc), but
requiring information reporting by consumers on merchants would be something different. It would also violate the
conditions of centralization and book-keeping infrastructure that Lederman identified.

21

In summary, TPIR is likely to be adopted only where the incremental cost of gathering
transaction information (including identities of transacting parties) is small relative to business
practices in the absence of tax, and especially if the additional cost of transmitting such
information is matched by a distinct benefit for the government in identifying the tax base.
Modern economic conditions and income tax law have molded a large portion of the individual
income tax base to fit these conditions, but much of the rest of the tax base of “modern taxes”
has never come close to meeting these conditions. I believe this account constitutes a more
parsimonious description of patterns in the actual use of information reporting than previous
accounts. Identifying such a systematic pattern should make the effective scope of information
reporting less of an article of faith.
C. Recent evidence: Does credit card reporting increase compliance?
The theory just advanced is consistent with the very mixed evidence for the effectiveness
of TPIR when implemented beyond the realm of wage and financial income. A uniquely
authoritative study on this topic was carried out recently by economists at the IRS and the
University of Michigan. 109 Slemrod et al. examine how self-employed individual taxpayers
(Schedule C filers) in the U.S. responded to information reporting newly introduced in 2011.
Under the new reporting regime, electronic payments received by businesses (e.g. credit card
payments and payments by online commerce platforms like eBay) are reported by the firms
processing these payments. This enabled the researchers to carry out a large-scale study: Slemrod
et al. matched 2.5 million new information returns (1099-Ks) filed in 2012 to the tax returns of
over a million Schedule C filers. 110
At first glance, IRS’ capacity to analyze such a large quantity of information may bolster
one’s confidence that TPIR would help detect and deter non-compliance. However, Slemrod et
al.’s study suggests three sobering conclusions. First, the new information reporting regime has
not detectably increased taxpayer compliance. Second, the data that the IRS possesses about
individuals’ business income even under the post-2011 regime is very incomplete and noisy. And
third, although careful econometric analyses establish instances of taxpayers’ strategic behavior
in response to information reporting, the nature of the strategic behaviors detected is difficult to
interpret; the data analysis thus does not yield clear audit implications.
1. 1099-K reporting: incompleteness and minimal deterrence effect
Slemrod et al. first found that at least in the first two years (2011-2), the introduction of
Form 1099-K had no impact on the aggregate net income reported by Schedule C filers. 111 There
was also no detectable additional deterrence effect relative to pre-existing information
reporting. 112 They conclude that “the overall initial deterrence effect of the new form of reporting
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was minimal.” 113 Rather, the main impact of the introduction of Form 1099-K discovered by
their study is on a small group of taxpayers representing less than 10% of their sample: the
characters and behavior detected of this group are further discussed below. 114 But before turning
to such specific findings, it is important to reflect on Slemrod et al.’s finding about the overall
population—of minimal deterrence. This seems disappointing, especially to those who had
advocated the adoption of the credit-card reporting. Whatever social costs have been incurred in
the preparation and issuance of 1099-K forms, no new revenue, it appears, was raised.
This result can be explained in a number of ways. For instance, the most common type of
tax evasion is done through cash transactions anyway. 115 But perhaps equally importantly, even
if one disregards tax-motivated uses of cash, one might be concerned that the scope of creditcard reporting is insufficiently broad. Slemrod et al’s data suggests that for those taxpayers
subject to 1099-K reporting, more than 85% reported receipts that are significantly greater than
the amounts shown on the 1099-Ks they receive—indeed, most taxpayers report far more—and
only fewer than 5% reported significantly less. 116 Under Slemrod et al’s theoretical assumptions,
in the absence of information reporting, taxpayers who are predisposed to cheat will under-report
business receipts. When there is information reporting, these taxpayers may believe that failing
to declare at least the amounts of receipts reported on Form 1099-Ks substantially and
discontinuously increases the risk of audit. Therefore, such taxpayers would report amounts on
their Schedule Cs that are at least equal to amount reported on 1099-Ks. In other words,
information reporting creating a floor for reported receipts. When this idea is applied to the real
world, however, it appears that this floor was binding only for about 10% of the Schedule C filer
population.
This is consistent with the idea that for most businesses, a substantial gap may exist
between the volume of all market transactions and the volume of transactions for which the
parties maintain mutual identities. Indeed, this idea is the basis for the main analytical strategy of
Slemrod et al’s study. They assume that amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks will accurately
represent the total business receipts only for a very small segment of taxpayers, e.g. online sellers
who derive most of their receipts from the likes of eBay, etc. Based on this assumption, they
hypothesize that among those taxpayers whose reported receipts on Schedule C closely match
amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks, a substantial portion will be taxpayers with “a high
propensity to under-report receipts prior to the introduction of information reporting”. 117 In other
words, rather than seeing amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks as setting a relevant benchmark for
truthful reporting, close matching between Schedule C and 1099-K receipts should be seen as a
potential sign of cheating.
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This methodology stands the traditional conception of the benefits of information
reporting (e.g. in connection with wage and passive financial income) on its head. Under the
traditional paradigm, third-party payors provide near-complete information about taxable income
to the government, such that taxpayers are “unable to cheat” on such income. 118 For credit-card
reporting, however, third-party information may be so incomplete in respect of both taxable
receipts and deductible expenses that two consequences inevitably follow. First, credit-card
reporting may leave plenty of room for the under-statement of taxable receipts for taxpayers
whose receipts far exceed the amounts subject to 1099-K reporting. Second, even if credit card
reporting forces some taxpayers to report more taxable receipts than they would have reported
otherwise, they are not thereby “disabled” from cheating, because they can still fudge numbers
on the deductions side. This second consequence is illustrated by Slemrod et al’s finding of
taxpayer strategic behavior.
2. Strategic behavior in response to information reporting
Slemrod et al postulate that credit card reporting would force some taxpayers to report
more taxable receipts than they would otherwise. But two other types of related behavior are also
likely. First, these taxpayers may report amounts on their Schedule Cs not much more than, and
possibly exactly equal to, amount reported on 1099-Ks. Second, they may increase reported
expenses to offset increased reported receipts, because it is more difficult to verify expenses than
to verify receipts: when information reporting is incomplete, third-party-reported amounts may
set a useful floor for reported receipts, but they do not provide a useful ceiling for reported
expenses. Overall, then, Slemrod et al argue that if one observes taxpayers who (i) file tax
returns only when subject to information reporting, (ii) whose self-declared receipts largely
match third-party reported receipts, and/or (iii) whose expenses closely match receipts, such
patterns are potentially indicative of a propensity towards tax evasion.
Motivated by such reasoning, Slemrod et al. focused on the 9-10% of their taxpayer
sample that reported gross receipts within 5% of the gross amount on the 1099-K’s issued to
them. This is the group of taxpayers that “bunched” around the point where the ratio of (i) the
receipts reported on 1099-K forms issued to the taxpayer (denoted “K’) to (ii) gross receipts
reported on a taxpayer’s Schedule C (denoted “R’) is 1. 119 Slemrod et al. observe that taxpayers
with K/R close to 1 report unusually large increases in receipts from 2010 to 2011, which cannot
be explained by the trend of growth of taxpayers that happen to have a high share of true receipts
subject to information reporting. Instead, it is likely that many taxpayers with K/R close to 1
reported more receipt after becoming subject to additional third-party reporting.
Slemrod et al. find several other types of evidence of taxpayer strategic behavior. First,
taxpayers with K/R close to 1 in 2011 were substantially less likely to have filed a Schedule C in
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prior years. 120 Second, taxpayers bunching around K/R=1 also reported large increases in
expenses, which to a great extent offset the increases in reported receipts by this group, resulting
in little change in net income reported. Third, taxpayers bunching at where K/R=1 and new
Schedule C filers who also receive1099-Ks are disproportionately likely to also bunch around the
point where the ratio of reported expense to receipt is 1. Fourth and finally, the authors examine
the composition of expenses to see precisely where taxpayers increased expense reporting to
offset increased receipts reporting, and find increases occurred primarily in the “Other Expenses”
line item. In other words, the new reported expenses seem opaque in their nature.
It seems likely, therefore, that some of the “bunching” taxpayers are cheating. The group
of taxpayers showing the foregoing “suspect” patterns comes up to about 1% of the total
population of taxpayers that the authors studied. 121 This suggests a potential benefit of TPIR for
improving the IRS’ audit strategies, despite the overall finding that U.S. credit card reporting has
not yet improved taxpayer compliance. If one thinks of the IRS’s task of enforcing the law on
schedule C filers as searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack, the new regime, it might
be suggested, has the potential of both reducing the size of the haystack and also the size of the
needle. It reduces the size of the haystack by getting the IRS to focus on the “bunchers”: 1099-K
reporting gives the IRS a specific target group to direct its limited enforcement resources. It also
enlarges the size of the needle by revealing taxpayers’ strategic behavior, such as new Schedule
C filing, increased claims of expenses, and matching claims of increased expenses and receipts.
Information reporting, in other words, may generate footprints for the IRS to follow. 122
However, this optimistic view faces at least two objections. First, unlike taxpayers who
under-declare wage income compared to amounts reported on their W-2s, many bunchers
displaying “suspect” revenue and expense patterns may not be cheating. There are other, benign
reasons why taxpayers may have increased receipt reporting (including by filing Schedule C for
the first time) in response to information reporting, while simultaneously increasing reported
expenses. 123 Therefore audits of this taxpayer population will need to pick out the “needles”
from the irrelevant, “needle-like” items. 124 Second, Slemrod et al find that the “bunching”
120
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taxpayers tend to be significantly smaller than the typical 1099-K recipients. 125 The revenue
potential for devoting audit resources to this group is thus limited, and may compare unfavorably
with the option of auditing larger taxpayers. In other words, focusing on “bunchers” does not so
much reduce the size of the haystack as to direct the IRS to an arbitrarily-determined corner of it.
Therefore, it is not clear that credit-card information reporting will lead to superior audit
strategies. Its potential at generating deterrence is similarly unclear.
The foregoing critique is not meant to imply that the adoption of 1099-K reporting in the
U.S. cannot have beneficial effects for U.S. tax administration. But it does suggest a general
conclusion about the limitations of the TPIR’s utility, given its limited implementability. This
limitation has two aspects. Suppose that, for the reasons given in Part III.B, TPIR requirements
may be implementable only for a fraction of market transactions. Suppose that this fraction is β.
Then, first, if for many taxpayers, the proportion of transactions they are disposed to report (α)
without TPIR is a higher proportion (i.e. α > β), then TPIR will have no effect on the
compliance behavior of these taxpayers. 126 This is so, even if α may be significantly less than 1.
Second, when the coverage of TPIR is incrementally raised, some taxpayers may be forced to
increase reporting their taxable receipts, while engaging in related strategic behavior. It is not
clear, however, that the IRS should audit such taxpayers, because audit selection may be based
not on how low α is, but on how likely it is that an audit will result in significant adjustments—
which depends not only on α but also the size of the taxpayer. 127
IV. Firms as “Fiscal Intermediaries”: An Inadequate Conception
Previous scholars postulate that third-party reporting is an essential tax collection device
that explains modern tax compliance and the capacity of developed countries to raise high levels
of revenue. 128 By contrast, I have portrayed third-party reporting as a derivative institution,
incapable of explaining tax compliance by business firms and frequently substituted by other
administrative devices in the history of modern taxation. Similarly, whereas many scholars view
the scope of TPIR as affording indefinite expansion in the future, 129 I argue that TPIR is
characterized by definite limits. Nonetheless, I believe one fact that previous scholars have
identified may still hold the key to understanding modern tax collection: namely, the centrality of
business firms to the administration of modern taxes, be it the withholding of individual income
and payroll, or retail sales taxes or the payment of the corporate income tax, the VAT, and other
business taxes. 130 The main question, I would argue, is how to conceptualize the causal
connection between firms and tax compliance.
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The prevailing view of the role of firms in tax compliance is that they act as “fiscal
intermediaries”: they collect and remit taxes, as well as provide information about other
taxpayers, to the government. 131 Firms generate tax-related information to the government in two
ways. First, by providing information directly to the government about the taxable income and
taxable transactions of employers, investors, and customers, they preclude the possibility of not
reporting such income or transactions by the latter taxpayers. Second, firms maintain accounting
and transaction records, which represent information that is not automatically transmitted to the
government but which the government may use in conducting audits. 132 Through both
mechanisms, firms act as depositories of accurate taxpayer information which the government
can access. This substantially increases the probability of detection of non-compliant behavior,
sometimes to close to 100%. It therefore dramatically improves the deterrence effect of penalties
on non-compliance.
This conception of firms as passive depositories as well as mechanical intermediaries of
transactional information is, to my knowledge, unusual in legal and social scientific scholarship
outside the study of taxation. It is often explicitly tied to the classic deterrence theory of tax
compliance, pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo. 133 Under the Allingham and Sandmo model,
a taxpayer decides whether to engage in tax evasion by weighing the expected benefits of
evasion against expect costs from being caught and penalized. Taxpayers comply when the
expected disutility of evasion, which depends on the probability of detection and the magnitude
of penalties, outweighs its expected utility. It has been widely observed that by itself, this simple
model of the choice about whether to evade taxes seems unable to explain the high level of tax
compliance observed at least in developed countries: the actual levels of penalties, audits, and
evasion detected during audits in real life are all far too low to lead a rational individual
considering only these factors to decide against tax evasion. 134 Nonetheless, scholars have
suggested that the Allingham and Sandmo model can be salvaged if one “puts firms into [the
theory]”. 135 When firms both automatically provide information to the government and maintain
information relevant to audits, then the probability of detection of tax evasion (conditional upon
an audit being carried out) is increased. Moreover, when there are fewer firms than individual
taxpayers, the audit rate for firms is higher than for individuals, which also increases the
probability of detection.
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Yet as our earlier discussion anticipated, 136 this effort to reconcile the Allingham and
Sandmo model with the observed high levels of tax compliance in the real world merely begs a
further question: why do decision-makers in firms—owners, managers, and employers— choose
not to evade tax? Why do they provide accurate information about other taxpayers to the
government? In most countries, the population of firms is still large relative to the number of tax
auditors, which means that the general probability of detection of tax evasion by firms would still
be very low. Is there any device that renders firms intent on evasion “unable to cheat”? If not,
then the Allingham and Sandmo model still cannot be reconciled with the levels of (firm) tax
compliance observed in the world. Something else must explain observed firm compliance.
One of the latest attempts to solve this puzzle is found in the KKS study mentioned in
Part I. 137 KKS analyze a firm’s “decision” not to evade tax as the feasibility for employers and
employees to maintain an equilibrium of collusion: if everyone in the firm can agree to and
honor a bargain to cheat on the taxes that the firm is required to remit, and to divide up the firms’
consequent cash savings, then the firm will evade taxes. They argue that such equilibrium would
be difficult to maintain under two types of circumstances. First, individual disgruntled (or
morally conscientious) employees create a small probability that the collusion would be reported
and detected, and such probabilities would become sufficiently large when the firm is
sufficiently large. 138 Second, the government can offer monetary awards for whistleblowing to
employees who otherwise would have been willing to collude in the firm’s tax evasion. KKS in
effect offer an analog of the Allingham and Sandmo model for firms: the probability of detection
of evasion behavior crucially depends, not on audits conducted by the government, but on
disgruntled employees or whistleblowers.
Unfortunately, this account of firms’ tax compliance decisions is just as problematic as
the traditional account of individual tax compliance decisions. To begin, although whistleblower
programs operated by tax and other regulatory agencies have attracted attention in recent years,
their role in the history of tax and other areas of regulatory enforcement has been minimal. 139
Even today, whistleblower programs are viewed as complements to regulatory agencies’ audit
operations, allowing the government to discover violations that would otherwise be difficult to
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uncover, 140 rather than as a mechanism imposing more systematic constraints on taxpayers and
other regulated subjects than audits themselves. It is simply implausible to claim that
whistleblower programs undergird the transformation of public finance in the 20th century
witnessed in most advanced economies. 141 Moreover, while it is commonly observed that larger
firms tend to be more compliant with tax law and other legal requirements, firm size in itself
does not preclude fraudulent activity: recent reports of large-scale frauds at Volkswagen and
Wells Fargo offer vivid reminders of this fact. 142
In the (vast) legal and social scientific literature on tax compliance, 143 the inadequacy of
the Allingham and Sandmo model has led to a variety of theories about why individuals may be
motivated to follow the tax law. 144 It is not the intention of this Article to review or even
summarize this variety of theories. 145 I will instead note two features of the literature. First,
theories that are presented as major alternatives to the Allingham and Sandmo model tend to
postulate psychological features of individuals that are not captured by that model. 146 However,
to my knowledge, none has attempted to “put firms into [the theory]” in the way that scholars
(such as KKS) aiming to salvage/expand the Allingham and Sandmo model have done. In other
words, only scholars interested in reformulating the Allingham and Sandmo model have given
significance to the regular empirical association between the presence of business firms and
higher levels of tax compliance. Yet at Part I discussed, such empirical regularity seems
unmistakable and forms part of the conventional wisdom of what makes tax administration
effective. Of course, conventional wisdoms may be mistaken (as I have argued is the case for the
belief about the importance of TPIR), but they may also be robust and offer important theoretical
insights.
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Second, many scholars have formulated theories and empirically tested hypotheses about
tax compliance as though tax compliance is a self-contained social problem. 147 Although some
legal scholars have argued that people comply with the tax law simply because there is a social
norm of complying with the law, 148 this is not an approach generally followed. Instead, scholars
tend to study individual preferences and attitudes specifically towards tax compliance, as if
paying tax has become a deep-rooted part of our psyche. 149 Yet modern taxation directly
affecting the obligations of mass populations of individuals has been practiced in most countries
for barely a century.
These features of the existing literature imply that existing theories of tax compliance
may have neglected two institutional foundations of modern tax collection. The first is the
business firm, which performs most of the compliance obligations under all modern taxes. 150
Ironically, those scholars who have stressed the business firm’s significance in tax compliance
have at the same time conceived of it in such as a way (i.e. as a mechanical information
depository and transmission device) as to give it very limited explanatory power. The second is
the modern legal system, as embodied by institutions that play legislative, regulatory,
enforcement, and adjudicatory functions, and as animated by the social norm of compliance with
the law. The key to understanding tax compliance may precisely lie in understanding how
individual behavior is mediated by these two types of institutions. I now describe how such an
explanation would work.
V. Firms as Sites of Social Cooperation Ordered by Law
Consider the postulate that in modern (i.e. industrial and post-industrial) economies, most
business firms operate, for the most part, in compliance with the law. If this is true, then an
important social scientific question will be why it is true—what has brought about the state of
affairs it describes. But let me clarify first what the postulate means and what follows from it, if
it is true.
The claim that most modern business firms mostly comply with the law is meant to
convey the following two ideas. First, most firms operate in ways that are constrained by a wide
range of legal rules and norms. That is, a firm makes its decisions while heeding most of the
requirements of contract law, tort law, property (including intellectual property) law, and other
relevant bodies of private law. It also attends to the relevant requirements of various bodies of
regulatory law, such as those regarding public and workplace safety, labor and employment,
147
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environmental protection, financial prudence and disclosure, and so on. This does not mean that
the firm is necessarily perfectly compliant with the law. Far from it. Volkswagen may
systematically install illegal "defeat devices" in its diesel engines to dodge the Environmental
Protection Agency’s emission tests. 151 But this could happen while the company at the same time
conscientiously follows all kinds of other legal requirements imposed by Germany and the
United States. Wells Fargo may put intense pressure on retail branch employees to meet sales
targets, knowing that this had led to and would continue to lead to the creation of fake customer
accounts, but the bank meanwhile could very well be highly compliant in its tax and securities
filings. 152 In other words, for many firms that purposely engage in one type of illegal behavior or
another, they nonetheless are acting in compliance with a wide range of other applicable laws.
They do not cheat “wherever they can”, in the sense of exploiting every opportunity of earning
an expected profit by violating the law.
Second, while some business firms may be better behaved than Volkswagen and Wells
Fargo, others are of course more ill-behaved. Some firms act in dodgy ways in respect of many
legal requirements. But it may be plausible to classify these firms into several categories. To
begin, there are the very small firms—indeed in economists’ use of the term, a “firm” could be a
sole business proprietor. A small firm’s behavior would not be distinguishable from the behavior
of its few individual owners or employees, and there is little intra-firm organization or
coordination. Alternatively, a frequently law-dodging firm could be large, but we expect to be
one that is otherwise uncompetitive in the market it operates: it needs to cheat wherever possible
just to survive. 153 Finally, there are of course firms that are formed deliberately to commit fraud
or other crimes. However, putting this last type of firms aside, and even considering small firms
and firms under intense competitive pressure and the fact that these firms are more likely to act
in disregard of the law than others, the following seems to be true: few firms are organized with
the expectation that it would deliberately profit from the violation of all laws that are profitable
to violate, and few firms grow and remain competitive by profiting from illegal activities. This is
what I mean by the claim that most modern business firms mostly comply with the law,
Having explained the meaning of the claim, I now explain one crucial consequence of it.
The claim implies that most modern business firms would not make decisions about tax
compliance in the way that KKS’ model suggests: they do not decide to comply with the tax law
only when an internal collusive bargain about how to divide the spoils of tax evasion cannot be
sustained. Instead, complying with the tax law, likely complying with other bodies of laws, is the
default option. If a firm is generally compliant with the law, then compliance with the tax law
should simply be expected. Specific firms may be engaged in non-compliance with the tax law at
specific times, but such behavior is to be explained in the same way as one would want to
explain why Volkswagen decided to install its “defeat devices”, and why Wells Fargo pushed its
employees towards fraudulent practices. In other words, when the baseline expectation is
compliance, specific instances of non-compliance are what require explanation, not the multitude
of instances of compliance.
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Here, it should be noted that KKS’ model has a common structure with the Allingham
and Sandmo model of individual tax compliance: the taxpayer, whether a firm or an individual,
always confronts a meaningful choice between complying and not complying with tax law, and it
would choose to comply only when the expected penalty for non-compliance is large enough.
Moreover, this choice is conceived in a way that could characterize choices about whether to
comply with any other body of law: as long as the expected rewards of non-compliance outweigh
the expected punishment of non-compliance, non-compliance should be observed. The empirical
postulate above about modern business firms’ general tendency towards law compliance
precisely contradicts the premise of these theoretical models. 154 It claims instead that modern
business firms are generally law-abiding, or at least enough of them are for tax and other
regulatory systems generally to function.
But making this postulate is not the end, but only the beginning, of social scientific
inquiries. The important social scientific question is not why, given the default choice of
cheating, most (large) firms don’t cheat on their taxes. It is rather why these firms may not even
consider cheating on their taxes—why cheating is not their default choice. A number of
theoretical and historical considerations suggest that there may be genuine answers to this
question, and that it does not just offer a rhetorical reformulation of the seemingly intractable
controversy about what produces compliance on the part of individual taxpayers.
The first, theoretical consideration is that firms generally form in order to earn some
economic rent. 155 If there is no economic rent to be made, one can simply purchase and sell in
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the market and there is no need to form a firm. 156 However, if firms are generally formed with
the purpose of earning rent given market prices, then there is no need for firms already formed to
further exploit profits from violations of the law. It is true that some illegal activities can be
conducted only through firms (e.g. certain Ponzi schemes, VAT carousal fraud, etc.). 157 But it is
also the case that most illegal activities can be pursued without forming firms. Therefore, if a
firm is formed not in order to profit from illegal activities, but with the purpose of earning rents
from other identified opportunities, then it would not be surprising if the firm does not
maximally exploit opportunities arising from illegal behavior—that is simply not its purpose.
A second consideration, which is both theoretical and historical in nature, is that much of
the modern legal system is concerned with how to divide up the rent earned by firms among the
contributors to the firm—employees, lenders, equity investors, suppliers and customers. 158 This
is what corporate and other organizational law is about. 159 It also forms an important part of the
substance of employment, labor and securities law. That is to say, social cooperation that is
centered on a firm inherently presupposes ways of dividing up the surplus from cooperation, and
the legal system appears to have been deeply involved in facilitating this division and thus
enabling firm-centered cooperation. Therefore, firm-centered social cooperation is a
paradigmatic form of “legal order”—social cooperation mediated by legal norms. 160
A recent study by Suresh Naidu and Noam Yuchtman of labor market institutions in 19thcentury United States vividly illustrates this consideration. 161 Naidu and Yuchtman examine a
part of U.S. history (1850 until the early 1920s) when labor markets were still largely
unregulated. 162 They first show that firm-specific rents were frequently observed in urban
American labor markets: when firms experienced positive output price shocks, their employees
earned wage premia, relative to other employees with very similar skills in the same urban labor
market. They then argue that the existence of rents in the labor contract created space for
bargaining and conflict between employees and employers: strikes became sharply more
frequent in the late 19th century and early 20th century, often involved physical coercion against
replacement workers, and were correlated with higher workers' wages. On their side, employers
occasionally called in the police and military to break strikes, but more frequently and equally
effectively sought judicial injunctions to end strikes. In other words, even before the advent of
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labor and employment regulations, both the coercive apparatus of the state and judicial
institutions were called upon to resolve intra-firm conflicts. Subsequent labor and wage
regulations that began to be adopted at the state level in the early 20th century and at the federal
level as a result of the New Deal are clearly more permanent legal institutions that allowed firmcentered social cooperation to continue.
In other words, reliance on the legal system—and in particular on the regulatory
apparatus of the state—may be essential to the growth of the modern business firm as we know
it. Compliance with legal rules and norms, and monitoring the compliance of other parties, are
intrinsic aspects of the modern business firm as an institution. From this perspective, the basic
reason that large firms are more likely to be compliant is not that the probability of motivated
whistleblowers is higher in them (or that they have greater external visibility). The potentially
more important reason is that the firms grew larger because they were profitable, and the
participants in them are more interested in the orderly division of profits than the disorder
implied by cheating (on taxes and other regulatory matters). While the keeping of business
records and proper accounting practices form a part of this cooperative process, their main
benefit for tax compliance may arise not from facilitating effective audits by the government, but
from the fact that they allow participants in a firm to monitor one another in assessing whether
the expectation of fair divisions of profits is fulfilled.
This conjecture seems consistent with history of modern taxation in different industrial
economies. In the United States, for example, the adoption of the “mass income tax” began in
1939 and the withholding of income tax on wage payments—the administrative institution that
scholars previously focused on—began in 1943. 163 Both were pre-dated by the adoption of
withholding of social security taxes in 1935. To track the roots of income tax compliance in the
United States, therefore, one needs to explain why business firms complied with the social
security excise on employers and with the even earlier legal requirements (enacted in 1909) to
pay corporate income taxes. Previous tax legal scholarship has suggested that the corporate
income tax was conceived from the beginning as at least in part a device for regulating large U.S.
corporations, and this regulatory impulse was also manifest in corporate and anti-trust law
developments at the same time. 164 But just as relevantly, corporations and employers in general
had already been subject to other forms of regulation, to facilitate the formation of American
financial and labor markets. By the time the corporate income tax was put in place, whether or
not to comply with the law was presumably neither a new question nor one that businesses can
easily give a negative answer to, if they were to continue to operate at all.
In summary, it seems that as a matter of actual history, two interrelated institutions might
have represented the central components of the foundation of modern tax collection. The first is
the business firm. The second is the set of legal rules and norms that developed from the 18th to
the 20th century that accompanied the growth of the corporate form: organizational law, anti-trust
and securities regulation, and labor and employment law, in addition to the ever-present bodies
163

Notably, the previous version of wage withholding, introduced in 1860, involved the withholding only by the
federal government as employer, not business firms.
164
See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1193; Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 447,

34

of contract, property, tort and other private law. Because the operation of most business firms
was inseparable from the implementation and following of legal orders, the decision to comply
with the tax law was a natural one for firms to make. Upon these foundations, both business
taxes and taxes imposed on individuals but remitted by businesses evolved, with withholding,
third-party reporting, other administrative devices, and legal doctrines that guide the use of such
devices all emerging simultaneously. Self-reporting, audits and other methods of enforcing the
tax law were always important to tax collection, just they were important to securing compliance
with other types of law applicable to firms. But most firms in most circumstances may also have
displayed a substantial degree of voluntary compliance, insofar as the laws they followed
enabled social cooperation in the context of the firm in the first place.
Three features distinguish the foregoing account of modern tax compliance from previous
accounts. First, the explanation is institutional: it makes reference to specific institutions, social
practices, and legal norms. By contrast, much of the social scientific literature on tax compliance,
like the Allingham and Sandmo model, is psychological and predicts social behavior from
assumptions about individual psychology (the only institutions assumed are tax return filing,
auditing and the imposition of penalties). The benefit of the institutional approach is that it
allows us to focus on explaining why rational, self-interested individuals may engage in
cooperation in specific contexts, instead of explaining why they are generally willing to
cooperate.
Second, while other scholars have also emphasized the importance of the firm as a crucial
institutional component of modern tax compliance, under the account given here, there is much
more going on in firms than the keeping of business records and accounting books potentially of
interest to tax auditors. Instead, firms are places where members of society actively cooperate
under regimes of law. Instead of gaming the system where they can, individuals pursued profit
and bargained for rent within the confines of law. This approach has strong support from
economic theories of the firm, 165 and allows the psychological theories of compliance to be
enriched by the rich theoretic and empirical literature in organizational economics.
Third, the account captures the intuition of many that there is nothing special about tax
compliance per se, vis-à-vis compliance with other aspects of the law: they should be explainable
by the same motivations. However, instead of postulating general pro-social, norms-respecting
motivations for individual taxpayers, the account suggests that they will be motivated to act this
way, in respect to many types of law, in the context of the firm. It is worth noting here that using
TPIR to explain modern tax compliance would provide one with no purchase in explaining most
others types of compliance with the law. As suggested above, the conception of business firms as
passive and mechanical depositories and transmission devices for taxpayer information has no
analogue in other literature. 166 Seeing business firms as institutions within which individuals can
cooperate in an indefinite range of ways while being regulated by an indefinite range of legal
norms, by contrast, not only constitutes a generalizable theory of tax compliance but also gives
such theory greater plausibility.
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VI. Policy Implications
Understanding the institutional foundations of modern taxation has deep policy
implications both for developing countries aiming to enhance their state capacity 167 and for
developed countries like the United States aiming to improve tax compliance. 168 This Part offers
a preliminary discussion of how the perspective developed in the preceding Parts suggests policy
directions different from what scholarship focused on TPIR would recommend.
A. Implications for Developing Countries
There is no doubt that in any country, when the level of tax compliance is low, tax
collectors thirst for taxpayer information. It is thus hard to overstate the appeal to developing
countries of the notion that high-tax, advanced economies have designed institutions for
transmitting and making use of massive amounts of taxpayer information. If such information
gathering devices can be adopted, they would be effective substitutes for voluntary compliance.
Taxpayers would have no choice but to obey the law. 169 A technological approach to tax
administration would then help many poor countries overcome the weaknesses of their
institutions.
As much as recent scholarship on TPIR has encouraged this notion, 170 this Article has
argued that it is fundamentally untenable. Promoting the forms of TPIR that are commonly
adopted in developed economies is unlikely to dramatically enhance tax administration capacity
in developing countries, for the following reasons. First, the standard forms of TPIR adopted by
developed countries apply to the collection of the personal income tax on wage and passive
financial income. But all available evidence suggests that developing countries already deploy
similar administrative devices—especially withholding—for such tax base. For example, Leslie
Robinson and Joel Slemrod examined whether developing countries use information reporting
and/or withholding less than developed countries, by systematically coding comparative
information about tax administration published by the OECD. 171 They analyzed, for each of 47
countries, (1) the total number of income categories for which tax is withheld and remitted by the
payer; (2) the total number of categories of income that are subject to information reporting; and
(3) the extent to which taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) are used as measured by the total
number of payment types that use TINs. It turns out that all of these variables are negatively
correlated with a country’s GDP per capita: the poorer countries use withholding, information
reporting, and identity-matching more. 172 They thus observe: “In higher-income countries, the
167
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revenue body uses withholding and reporting on fewer types of income.” 173 Similar studies done
by the IMF also suggest that many developing countries heavily rely on withholding. 174
It is thus very unlikely that developing countries are not attuned to the wide use of
withholding and TPIR for the personal income tax in developed countries. Instead, the problem
is much more likely that they have far smaller tax bases comprising wage and passive financial
income: their formal employment sectors and financial institutions are more under-developed. 175
The important question is then whether TPIR has proven to be useful, in the experience of
developed countries, outside the context of these particular components of the personal income
tax. As Parts I-III have shown, the answer is no. TPIR has had only limited application in the
individual business income context, 176 and its utility for increasing compliance in such a context
is still open to debate. 177 Moreover, such limitation may have universal explanations (e.g. in
terms of when market participants keep mutual identities) invariant to developmental contexts. 178
In addition, developed countries rarely use TPIR in connection with other important modern
taxes. It would clearly be a mistake to infer from the fact that wage and personal financial
income constitute larger tax bases in developed countries to the conclusion that developed
countries use TPIR in a wider variety of ways than (or in substantively different ways from)
developing countries. 179
As argued earlier, developed countries to a very large extent rely on businesses to
withhold, remit, and pay most taxes. 180 Voluntary business compliance lies at the foundation of
TPIR, not the other way around. 181 When businesses comply with the tax law, the government
can afford to be somewhat indifferent about whether information on individual taxpayers is
collected or analyzed. Tax administrators from developing countries are in fact likely to be quite
familiar with this logic. Developing countries generally rely far less on the personal income tax
and social security contributions for revenue than developed countries; the corporate income tax,
VAT, turnover taxes, and other business taxes collectively represent a much greater portion of
173
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the tax take. 182 One could thus say that business firms are the main source of revenue for
developing countries. What, then, differentiates between tax administrations in poorer and in
richer countries—what, from the perspective of law enforcement and compliance, explains the
striking difference among them captured by political economists? 183
This Article has suggested the following answer. The growth of business firms in
developed countries has been closely intertwined with the regulatory state, in that the latter has
played a crucial role in facilitating the division of economic profit within business firms. Within
the institution of the modern firm, rational, self-interested individuals are able to engage
profitably in a whole range of economic cooperation, in key part because they can rely on
regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of cooperation are divided in ways that are
bargained for. For this reason, participants in the firm are often willing to commit resources to
compliance with regulations and the law in general. This dynamic has evolved to a point that
firms generally do not consider non-compliance with tax law as their default option: after all, the
tax law is generally enacted and enforced by the same governments that have enacted and
enforce the other legal rules which are crucial to the cohesion of firms. What distinguishes richer
and poor countries, therefore, is that in the former there are more firms that operate in this mode,
both because of the greater development of markets and because of the deeper involvement of
governments in sustaining these markets.
Such an analysis clearly implies that the effectiveness of tax administration depends on
exogenous factors—factors that fall outside tax administrators’ control. Improving tax
administration must of necessity be viewed in a holistic manner. While information gathering
and enforcement aimed at producing deterrence are always important, tax collection will also
inevitably be a matter of relying on, contributing to, and, importantly, not disruptive of social
cooperation centered on business firms that is ordered by legal and regulatory systems.
Deterrence cannot substitute for voluntary compliance. Therefore one must be cautious about
adopting any instrument of deterrence if it would undermine voluntary compliance. 184 This
provides new support to the idea that rule of law norms are important to tax administration. 185
B. Implications for the U.S. and Other Developed Countries
Third-party information reporting, only to a slightly lesser extent than withholding, has
become a deeply entrenched feature of personal income tax administration in the United States
and other advanced economies. 186 The expansion of TPIR in the U.S. in 2010 to include broker
reporting of the tax basis of securities and credit-card and electronic settlements of merchants, 187
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although still largely unrivaled by other countries, is not altogether surprising. Not only do the
costs of the new reporting requirements now seem acceptable and not overly onerous, the
issuance of 1099-Ks and similar forms will likely to be embraced by an ever-growing population
of taxpayers, as the forms help taxpayers to keep clear records and thereby reduce compliance
costs. 188
None of the arguments in this Article is meant to suggest that the U.S. should roll back
any specific type of TPIR that it currently adopts, or to deny that TPIR may have assorted
benefits for taxpayers. Nor do I advocate against any specific way of expanding the scope of
TPIR. If the arguments in Part III.B are correct, there are likely to be natural limits of TPIR,
expansion beyond which may generate substantial jumps in compliance costs. But the magnitude
of such costs will clearly depend on the technologies available. If, for example, few American
consumers and businesses use in the cash or even credit cards in the future, but instead rely on
newer technologies (such as Blockchain) to execute payments, it may be that even instantaneous
transactions will begin to leave digital trails that would identify the transacting parties and the
amount and nature of transactions. Should the IRS want to collect such information to limit
under-reporting of business income by self-employed individuals, it would probably be able to
do so more easily (and with less political resistance) than today.
But such speculations about how future technology might reduce tax evasion are
misguided, for at least two (related) reasons. First, it is highly likely that new technologies will
transform markets and economies, leading to substantial changes in the tax policy instruments
that societies adopt. In other words, the main tax bases in future economies will likely be
different from the tax bases today. 189 To imagine how future technology might solve tax
administration problems that exist only relative to the tax bases we have today is an odd form of
futuristic exercise. Second, unless technology by itself could guarantee large-scale social
cooperation, it seems implausible to imagine that in future societies there will not be criminals,
free-riders, and norm violators. Presumably, technologies are developed to enable most
cooperative humans to reap greater cooperative gains. They are not designed to make noncooperation impossible. Therefore, criminal and free-riders will find new ways to cheat, and it
will be completely irrelevant that they cannot cheat by exactly the same means as they do today.
Overall, that is, tax administration in the future (for those who care to think about it) will
depend on a wide range of social institutions and circumstances, just as, as this Article has
argued, 20th century taxation has relied on the business firm and modern regulatory law. To
improve tax administration today, one need to better understand what are the most relevant
factors determining compliance today. This Article has arguably suggested a very different
direction in which to look from prior scholarship.
Conclusion
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The arguments of this Article aim to enable one to see how modern governments can
practice “taxation without information”. This is exactly the opposite of how some recent political
economy scholarship (and much conventional wisdom within legal scholarship) suggests to be
the basic logic of modern taxation. 190 With no institutional foundation, it may be true that there
can be “no taxation without information”. 191 But modern taxation is precisely not devoid of
institutional foundation. The co-evolution of business firms and systems of regulatory law in
industrial economies is likely to have laid very robust foundations for compliance with the law,
which enabled the United States and many countries to quickly increase their levels of taxation
in the 20th century, sometimes within the space of a few years, 192 at a time when modern
computing technology was still at its infancy.
Modern taxation involves massive social cooperation: governments are put in place on
the basis of systematic transfers of wealth. The deterrence model of tax compliance purports to
explain taxpayers’ participation in such social enterprise by how they might be punished for freeriding. If social cooperation in general can be explained simply by reference to how free-riders
are deterred, the social sciences would be in a very different place from where they stand
today. 193 Conversely, if the emergence of social cooperation in human societies cannot be
explained by simple detection and punishment mechanisms, it is not clear why government and
taxation should constitute an exception. From this perspective, the Allingham and Sandmo
theory of tax compliance is clearly inadequate, as is the insistence that recognizing the role of
third-party information reporting would salvage the Allingham and Sandmo model. But merely
identifying psychological attitudes that characterize normal, compliant taxpayers in advanced
economies also does not do justice to the historical, cross-country, and even within-country
variations in the level of tax compliance. The understanding of tax compliance—and arguably of
compliance with modern regulatory law in general—must be more firmly grounded in the
understanding of a wider range of institutions.
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